Abstract -Yields on long-term munici-
INTRODUCTION
Municipal bonds issued by state and local governments differ from other investment vehicles in that their interest income is exempt from federal taxation. This tax advantage is a major determinant of yields on these bonds relative to taxable bonds. While the tax advantage depends on the current tax rate for short-term investors, both current and future tax rates are relevant for longterm investors. Thus, yields on municipal bonds reflect an important piece of information-the long-term investor's expectation of future income tax rates -that may affect the investment decisions of households and businesses. 1 This paper derives the expectation of future tax rates from yields on municipal bonds and examines the relationship between expected changes in tax rates and the financial condition of the federal government between 1965 and 1994, measured by outstanding debt, budget deficits, and inflation. A strong relationship between the two variables would suggest that the expectation of future tax rates is an additional channel through which fiscal policy affects economic activity. For example, a tax reduction that undermines government financial condition may cause the public to expect higher tax rates in the future, thereby failing to stimulate investment. In this case, policymakers would have to pay more attention to the indirect effect of fiscal policy through the expectation of future tax rates.
To examine this relationship, I estimate expected changes in tax rates from tax rates implied by yields on short-term and long-term municipal bonds. The short-term implied tax rate is determined largely by the current tax rate, while the long-term rate reflects current and expected tax rates. Thus, changes in the tax-rate gap should be driven mainly by changes in expected tax rates.
Empirical results support the expected relationship. I find that federal debt has a strong positive effect on expected changes in tax rates. This finding indicates that investors expect tax rates to increase in the future when the government faces financial difficulties. Inflation also positively affects the expected tax rate. A possible interpretation is that high inflation may cause investors to expect both tight fiscal and tight monetary policies to lower inflation. Various specifications and estimators produce the same qualitative results.
The paper is organized as follows. I begin by describing the tax-exempt status of municipal bonds and significant developments in the municipal bond market. The next section reviews competing hypotheses about the roles different income taxes play in determining the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds. Other factors affecting the yield spread are discussed in the fourth section. Then, I analyze the effect of the federal government's financial status on expected changes in income tax rates and present results. Last, the paper's findings are summarized.
TAX-EXEMPT STATUS
State and local governments rely heavily on bond issuance to finance budget deficits and large-scale capital projects. Municipal bonds outstanding amounted to $964 billion at the end of 1994, or about 7.5 percent of total credit market debt.
2 The bonds can be classified into two broad categories: general obligation bonds, which are issued mostly to meet general financing needs and are backed by the issuer's full faith and credit, and revenue bonds, which are issued to finance a specific project and are secured solely by funds generated from the project. General obligation bonds are typically safer than revenue bonds because they are backed by all sources of revenue and assets.
Interest income earned on most municipal bonds is exempt from federal taxation. State governments also offer tax benefits to investors in municipal bonds. In 1994, each of the 45 states with income taxes allowed the deduction of interest income from in-state bonds; two states also exempted income from out-of-state bonds.
Municipal bond holdings are concentrated among high-income households, which can realize more tax benefits. Feenberg and Poterba (1991) , who analyzed tax returns for 1987, 1988, and 1989 , found that over 50 percent of tax-exempt interest income was reported by households with $100,000 or more of adjusted gross income. In contrast, households with less than $30,000 of income earned only about 13 percent of tax-exempt interest income.
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The tax exemption enables state and local governments to issue debt at low costs. To prevent municipalities from abusing the privilege of issuing taxexempt bonds, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 toughened rules governing municipal bonds. Before this Act was passed, municipalities issued large amounts of industrial development bonds to subsidize private businesses and "arbitrage bonds" to invest in securities offering higher yields. The Act made industrial development bonds ineligible for tax exemption and required municipalities to turn over profits from arbitrage activities to the federal government. As a result, municipal bonds issued for private purposes, which represented about 20 percent of all municipal bonds outstanding in 1985, dropped to only about ten percent in 1993.
The Act also disallowed financial institutions from deducting interest paid on debt to carry tax-exempt securities. Thus, banks became unable to take advantage of the tax-exempt status of municipal bonds. The Act resulted in a dramatic decline in the share of municipal bonds held by commercial banks (Table 1) . 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
RELEVANT TAX RATE HYPOTHESES
The competing hypotheses about the tax rates reflected in yield spreads between taxable and tax-exempt bonds can be broadly classified into two groups: a partial equilibrium approach emphasizing investors' decisions and a general equilibrium analysis looking at the interaction between taxable and tax-exempt bond markets. The hypotheses suggest different roles for personal and corporate tax rates.
The partial equilibrium approach focuses on investors' selection between taxable and tax-exempt bonds. Investors will choose tax-exempt bonds if their return is greater than the after-tax return on taxable bonds. Thus, in equilibrium, the return on municipal bonds equals the after-tax return on taxable bonds for marginal investors. The market rate of return on municipal bonds then is determined by the marginal tax rate (both current and expected rates for long-term bonds) of marginal investors. Given this relationship, the key question is, who are the marginal investors?
Historically, banks have held largely short-term municipal bonds to match their short-term liabilities, and individuals have invested mostly in long-term municipal bonds (Hendershott and Koch, 1977; Mussa and Kormendi, 1979) . Based on this empirical regularity, the partial-equilibrium camp argues that the municipal bond market is segmented-banks are the marginal investors in short-term bonds, and individuals are the marginal investors in long-term bonds. Thus, the corporate income tax rate largely determines yields on short-term bonds, while the highest personal income tax rate governs yields on long-term bonds. Miller (1977) examines yields on tax-free bonds in a general equilibrium context. He analyzes the effects of corporate and personal income taxes on corporate financing decisions and individuals' investment decisions. These tax effects have to be neutralized in equilibrium. Thus, costs of debt and equity are the same for corporations. On the demand side, tax-exempt bonds, taxable bonds, and equity shares are equally attractive to those investors whose marginal tax rate is equal to the corporate income tax rate. Therefore, corporate income tax rates determine the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds, regardless of maturity.
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Empirical studies have produced mixed results. Many studies derive an implied tax rate from the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds and compare the implied tax rate with corporate and individual tax rates. According to Trzcinka (1982) , the yield spread adjusted for risk premiums produced implied tax rates close to corporate income tax rates in the 1970s. Poterba (1986) found that both personal and corporate tax changes affect yields on tax-free bonds relative to those on taxable bonds. Fortune (1988) argued that Trzcinka's result does not hold when the sample period is extended to the 1980s and that personal income tax rates more significantly affect the yield spread. Poterba (1989) also showed that long-term implied tax rates respond to changing expectations of individual income tax rates. Given these conflicting theoretical and empirical arguments, it is difficult to single out the most relevant tax rate affecting the taxable/tax-exempt yield spread.
This paper does not test the validity of the competing hypotheses. Since the financial condition of the federal National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 23-38 government should affect expectations of both corporate and personal income tax rates, it is not necessary to distinguish between these rates. However, there is a potential problem. The partialequilibrium view suggests that the municipal bond market is segmented. In that case, the difference between personal and corporate tax rates influences the spread between longterm and short-term implied tax rates, which I use as a measure of expected changes in tax rates. Furthermore, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which reduced the role of banks significantly, may have enlarged the role of individual tax rates in determining the short-term implied tax rates after 1986. Empirical analyses in a later section will consider these possibilities.
OTHER DETERMINANTS OF YIELD SPREADS
Although federal tax rates are a major determinant of the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds, other factors may also influence the spread, such as risk premiums, shortterm demand and supply conditions, special features of municipal bonds, state income taxes, and capital gains taxes. Some of these factors may influence either short-term or long-term implied tax rates more significantly, thereby affecting the measure of expected tax changes. Then, we need to control for the effects of those variables that unevenly affect yields on municipal bonds of different maturities.
Risk Premiums
Yield spreads between municipal and taxable bonds may contain risk premiums. To correctly infer tax effects from the yield spread, it is best to look at municipal and taxable bonds of comparable default risk. A sensible approach is to compare the highest quality municipal bonds with U.S. Treasury securities or the highest quality corporate bonds. Unfortunately, neither combination is immune to problems. Although general obligation bonds backed by state tax revenue have a low default risk, they are not as safe as Treasury securities because the federal government has a more stable tax base and can rely on monetary financing.
Assuming that ratings for municipal and corporate bonds are equivalent, it is more appropriate to compare AAArated municipal bonds with AAA-rated corporate bonds. Mussa and Kormendi (1979) and Trzcinka (1982) , however, argued that the criteria used in rating corporate and municipal bonds are not the same and are not constant over time. It is difficult to make the ratings comparable because different factors, such as the political process, affect municipal creditworthiness. Thus, the riskiness of municipal bonds differs from that of corporate bonds.
Demand and Supply Conditions
In the short run, the yield spread may be affected by demand and supply conditions in taxable and tax-exempt bond markets. Even if the two types of bonds were perfect substitutes, price adjustments might take time unless bond markets were perfectly liquid. Because of imperfect liquidity, large debt issuance by state governments can temporarily lower the price of municipal bonds. Institutional changes affect the demand for municipal bonds. For example, tax law changes in the mid1980s induced commercial banks to unload their municipal bond holdings and, hence, temporarily raised yields on them. Bond markets can also be National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 23-38 disturbed by international capital flows, such as the large purchases of U.S. Treasury securities by Japanese investors in the 1980s.
Special Features of Municipal Bonds
Callability and low liquidity reduce the attractiveness of municipal bonds relative to Treasury securities. Unlike Treasury securities, many long-term municipal bonds are callable. Moreover, they are not as liquid as Treasury bonds. Fortune (1991) attributed the lower liquidity to how municipal bonds are sold: A typical municipal bond consists of a series of small strips with differing maturities; the small size of each strip makes it more difficult to sell in secondary markets. Callability and low liquidity should result in higher yields on municipal bonds.
State Income Taxes
State income tax laws favor income earned on Treasury securities somewhat by exempting that income from state taxation. Although states exempt interest income earned on in-state municipal bonds, most of them tax interest income earned on out-of-state municipal bonds. Since these laws induce investors to hold in-state bonds, income earned on most municipal bonds is, in effect, exempt from state income taxes. Thus, the yield spread between Treasury and municipal bonds largely reflects federal income tax rates. Nevertheless, the tax disadvantage of municipal bonds at the state level may offset the federal tax advantage to a certain extent.
5 State income taxes more significantly influence the yield spread between corporate and municipal bonds because income earned on corporate bonds is fully taxable.
Capital Gains Taxes
Unlike interest income, capital gains from municipal bonds are taxable. Thus, investors may not realize the full tax benefit if they do not hold long-term municipal bonds to maturity. Sales before maturity usually involve some capital gains or losses. Accordingly, the possibility of early sale reduces the attractiveness of long-term municipal bonds. This possibility may be a serious consideration for high-income investors who expect to move into lower income brackets in the future, such as individuals approaching retirement age.
Among the factors discussed in this section, demand and supply conditions and state income taxes should similarly affect yields on both short-term and long-term municipal bonds. Other factors may influence yields on longterm municipal bonds more significantly. For example, risk premiums might be higher on long-term municipal bonds because uncertainties are greater in the long run. In addition, callability, lower liquidity, and capital gains taxes matter largely with long-term bonds. All of these factors contribute to increasing yields on long-term municipal bonds. Empirically, the yield curve has been more upward sloping for municipal bonds than for taxable bonds. 6 The discussion in this section, therefore, is consistent with this empirical regularity.
The measure of expected tax rates is influenced by variables disproportionately affecting yields on long-term municipal bonds. The next section controls for the effects of those variables to accurately analyze the effect of the government's financial condition on expected changes in tax rates.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND EXPECTED TAX RATES
This section explores the main hypothesis that investors expect tax rates to rise National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 23-38
Setting aside other factors influencing the yield spreads for the moment, the expected change in tax rates is as follows:
where the numbers in subscripts indicate the years to maturity.
The 20-year implied tax rate may be interpreted as the average tax rate expected by investors during the next 20 years. Thus, controlled for other factors, the expected tax change is the gap between the average tax rate during the next 20 years and the current tax rate. A larger value of the expected tax change indicates that investors expect a larger and sooner increase in tax rates. Figure 1 plots the five-year moving average of the expected tax change against the highest personal income tax rate (Panel A) and the corporate income tax rate (Panel B) . If the market prediction is correct, the moving average should rise as it approaches the date of an actual tax-rate increase. It appears that the market correctly predicted the decrease in the mid-1980s and the increase in the early 1990s. The moving average, however, does not appear to be consistent with the tax-rate decrease in the early 1980s. One possibility is that high inflation during the 1970s and the early 1980s caused noise. The effect of inflation will be discussed later.
Financial Condition of the Federal Government
I consider three variables as measures of the government's financial condition: federal debt, budget deficits, and inflation. The government must devote a large portion of its revenue to making when the federal government faces financial difficulties. My study employs quarterly data from 1965 to 1994. Yields on municipal bonds are obtained from Salomon Brothers's Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads for the period examined. For early years of the sample period, Salomon Brothers provides only the average yield of the first month of each quarter. For consistency, my study uses the first-month average for the entire sample period. I also employ the first-month averages of other variables available with monthly frequency.
Expected Changes in Tax Rates
Expected changes in tax rates are measured by the difference between the 20-year implied tax rate and the 1-year implied tax rate derived from yield spreads between Treasury securities and municipal bonds. 7 In equilibrium,
where R M = rate of return on municipal bonds (prime-grade general obligation bonds);
R T = rate of return on taxable bonds (Treasury securities); and t = marginal tax rate of marginal investors.
The implied tax rate can be obtained by solving equation 1 for t:
National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 23-38 interest payments when its debt is large. In addition to a large principal, the government may face a high borrowing cost, which makes the refinancing of existing debt and additional borrowing more difficult because it has already absorbed a substantial portion of national savings. Thus, with a large amount of debt outstanding, the government needs to rely less on debt financing and more on tax financing in the future. Large government debt should therefore cause rational investors to expect higher tax rates.
For the same reason, a large budget deficit is not sustainable. Ultimately, it will force the government to reduce spending, increase taxes, or both. Thus, the effects of chronic budget deficits are similar to those of outstanding debt. The overall effects, however, may be smaller because budget deficits can be temporary.
Inflation can also affect government financial condition in various ways. For instance, the government might be able to dilute existing debt if it could unexpectedly increase inflation and sustain high inflation for a long time. High inflation can also raise effective tax rates by inflating capital gains and reducing the real value of depreciation expenses. 8 In these cases, increased inflation improves financial condition. High inflation, however, is usually followed by efforts to curb inflation because it causes both economic and political problems. Lowering inflation requires contractionary economic policies: slower money growth, lower spending, higher taxes, or any combination of these. Thus, assuming that high inflation is not sustainable, investors may expect tax rates to increase when inflation is high.
To control for the size of the economy, I divide federal debt and budget deficits by gross domestic product (GDP). Budget deficits and GDP are influenced by the business cycle. To alleviate this problem, I use the structural measure of budget deficits and potential GDP estimated by the Congressional Budget Office based on a nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment. The measure of inflation here is the average of annualized percentage changes in the consumer price index in the 12 preceding months. Figure 2 compares the expected tax change with the percentage of outstanding federal debt to GDP (federal debt). The figure displays a positive relationship between the two variables, indicating that investors expect tax rates to increase when federal debt is large. The gap between the two variables was large from the mid-1970s and to the early 1980s when inflation was high. Investors might have expected that such high inflation was not sustainable.
Estimation
To examine expectations of tax rates more rigorously, I regress the expected tax change on variables reflecting the financial condition of the government and other relevant factors discussed in previous sections. Table 2 presents the definitions of the variables. In addition to federal debt, the deficit, and inflation, the regression includes the default risk premium (risk premium), the volatility of long-term interest rates (volatility), the term structure of interest rates (yield curve), the gap between the corporate and the highest personal income tax rate (tax gap), the progressiveness of individual income tax (tax progressiveness), and dummy variables related to institutional and political National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 23-38 developments (tax gap dummy, Tax Act 1986, President, and Congress).
Default risk premiums may vary with macroeconomic conditions. Holding other things constant, the yield spread between municipal and Treasury bonds may then move in the same direction as the yield spread between BAA-rated and AAA-rated corporate bonds (Moody's ratings). Assuming that risk premiums affect long-term yields more significantly due to more uncertainties in the long run, a large value of the risk premium reduces the expected tax change because the long-term implied tax rate decreases more than the shortterm implied tax rate.
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When the volatility of long-term interest rates is high, callable bonds are more likely to be redeemed early. Furthermore, more income from bond holdings is likely to be in the form of capital gains. Therefore, a large value of volatility reduces the expected tax benefit and increases the value of the callability option. Since both factors decrease the attractiveness of long-term municipal bonds, a large value of 20-year implied tax rate minus 1-year implied tax rate (percentage points)
Percentage of net federal debt (total liabilities minus financial assets) outstanding at the end of the preceding quarter to potential GDP of the preceding quarter National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 23-38 volatility may increase yields on longterm municipal bonds, resulting in a low long-term implied tax rate. Thus, the expected tax change is expected to decrease with volatility.
Expected changes in interest rates also affect the value of the callability option and the expected tax benefit. When interest rates are expected to rise, capital gains and early redemption are less likely, making long-term municipal bonds more attractive. An expectation of higher interest rates is associated with a steep yield curve. A large value of the yield curve should increase the expected tax change.
The tax gap intends to capture the possible effect of market segmentation. When marginal investors are banks in the short-term municipal bond market and individuals in the long-term municipal bond market, the expected tax change increases with the gap between the highest individual income tax rate and the corporate income tax rate. Considering that municipal bonds are held by many individuals in lower income tax brackets, the progressiveness of personal income tax is also relevant; tax progressiveness might reduce the effect of the tax gap. In addition, the coefficient of the tax gap should be smaller after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which induced banks to withdraw from the municipal bond market. Thus, the expected sign of the tax gap dummy is negative.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also contains other important provisions, such as the alternative minimum tax and the elimination of many "tax shelters." I include the Tax Act 1986 to examine if these provisions have affected the expected tax change. Since Democrats are inclined to a larger government, taxes are more likely to increase when the Democratic party controls the government. The coefficients of President and Congress should be positive.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions also include the first-order autoregressive term (AR(1)) to control for serial correlation. It is possible that expectations of tax changes affect macroeconomic conditions. To avoid the possibility of endogeneity, I use lagged values of the deficit, the risk premium, and the yield curve (the average of the previous quarter for the deficit and the average of the previous month for the risk premium and the yield curve).
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Other macroeconomic variables are already predetermined; federal debt is the amount outstanding at the end of the previous quarter, and inflation and volatility are the averages in the 12 preceding months. Since the error terms are not correlated with AR(1) correction, the lagged values can serve as reasonable instruments.
A major concern with time-series variables is stationarity. The Appendix presents the results of unit root and cointegration tests. All macroeconomic variables except for volatility and the yield curve appear to have unit roots, but they cointegrate. Thus, the error term is stationary. Still, the OLS estimator may not be efficient. To address this problem, I obtain an estimator with a time domain correction suggested by Saikkonen (1991) , which is an asymptotically efficient estimator of cointegration regressions. The specification involves the differences of lead and lag terms:
where x 1 is a vector of regressors with unit roots.
The time domain correction, which is designed to remove the effects of the short-run dynamics of error terms, also controls for the effect of serial correlation. National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 23-38 with the market segmentation hypothesis; before the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the personal income tax rate was the main determinant of yields on long-term municipal bonds, while the corporate income tax rate determined yields on short-term municipal bonds. The coefficient of the tax gap dummy, however, shows a magnitude larger than the theoretical prediction, which is the magnitude of the coefficient of the tax gap. A narrowed gap between the two tax rates after the Act may have exaggerated the coefficient of the tax gap dummy. Although the results are not presented here, the expected tax change has also been regressed on the current values, instead of the lagged values, of macroeconomic variables. In those regressions, the risk premium is statistically significant at the five-percent level with the expected sign. All other results are qualitatively similar.
Results

Conclusions
The yield spread between taxable bonds and municipal bonds reflects expected tax rates, as well as current tax rates. This paper has derived expected changes in tax rates from the difference between the long-term and the shortterm implied tax rates reflected in yields on long-term and short-term municipal bonds relative to taxable bonds. Helpman (1989) , who analyzes the foreign-debt problems of less developed countries, shows that large debt implies high future tax rates and therefore generally results in low investment. 2 Credit market debt includes mortgages and consumer credit, as well as Treasury and corporate bonds. 3 The interest expense deductibility was 100 percent prior to 1980 and gradually declined to 80 percent before it was completely eliminated by the Act. 4 Fama (1977) , who focuses on the banks' incentives to profit from the difference between their funding cost and the return on tax-exempt bonds, derives a similar result. His analysis, however, is not applicable to today's municipal bond market because the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the banks' arbitrage opportunities. 5 Kidwell, Koch, and Stock (1984) find that state income tax rates influence yields on municipal bonds.
6 Many studies, including Trzcinka (1982) , Kochin and Parks (1988), and Fortune (1991) The MacKinnon critical values at 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels are -4.0380, -3.4481, and -3.1489.
A regression of the same form is applied to the cointegration test. National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 23-38
